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Readers familiar with the workhorse of cosmology, the hot big bang model, may think that cosmology
raises little of interest about time. As cosmological models are just relativistic spacetimes, time is under-
stood just as it is in relativity theory, and all cosmology adds is a few bells and whistles such as inflation
and the big bang and no more. The aim of this chapter is to show that this opinion is not completely
right...and may well be dead wrong. In our survey, we show how the hot big bang model invites deep
questions about the nature of time, how inflationary cosmology has led to interesting new perspectives
on time, and how cosmological speculation continues to entertain dramatically different models of time
altogether. Together these issues indicate that the philosopher interested in the nature of time would do
well to know a little about modern cosmology.
Different claims about time have long been at the heart of cosmology. Ancient creation myths disagree
over whether time is finite or infinite, linear or circular. This speculation led to Kant complaining in his
famous antinomies that metaphysical reasoning about the nature of time leads to a “euthanasia of reason”.
But neither Kant’s worry nor cosmology becoming a modern science succeeded in ending the speculation.
Einstein’s first model of the universe portrays a temporally infinite universe, where space is edgeless and
its material contents unchanging. One of the more popular versions of the big bang model is temporally
finite: it begins with a bang and ends with a crunch. Later, Bondi and Gold’s rival to the hot big bang,
the steady state theory, is, like Einstein’s universe, premissed on the idea that the large scale features of
the universe don’t change in space or time (the so-called “perfect cosmological principle”). Rather more
exotic ideas followed: Milne, for example, abandoned relativity theory and posited two times nonlinearly
related to one another. Today the speculations continue. Often motivated by quantum considerations,
one finds plenty of alternative cosmologies to the big bang model’s contemporary successor, the ΛCDM
model. These alternatives range from cyclic time universes, to string-theoretic “branes” colliding in a
high-dimensional space, to eternally inflating multiverses chock full of bubble universes.
The reason for so much variety in cosmological possibility is simple: the universe is really big and
what we can see is really small. We are, in other words, faced with severe observational limitations in
the context of cosmology (Ellis, 2007) and hence a severe underdetermination of cosmological modeling
(Butterfield, 2014). According to relativity theory we can at best only detect signals from events within or
on our past light cone—this is the “observable universe” in the maximal sense; according to the standard
big bang model the observable universe is further limited physically by the existence of a surface of
last scattering: before the time of this event (decoupling) light was tightly coupled to matter such that
it could not travel in space and time to our telescopes here and now—this essentially means that we
don’t have observational access to the very early universe. Since the entire universe is most likely much,
much larger than the observable universe, what we can verify observationally gives us a relatively weak
handle on the nature of the cosmos at large. Thus, many genuinely scientific models can plausibly fit the
same observations, since the universe may well be very different outside the observational scope of our
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telescopes.
Furthermore, our astronomical and cosmological observations themselves are heavily theory- and
model-laden. Astronomy reveals just how much our judgments of distances, angles, and even objects de-
pend on background assumptions about the nature of astrophysical objects, the geometry of the universe,
etc. And a related additional consideration is that confidence in our own theories runs low in various
cosmological regimes. For example, the big bang model posits that the universe began with an initial
singularity. But should we trust general relativity at the high temperatures and energies of the big bang
itself? And does the addition of inflation to the big bang model modify this expectation? How might the
big bang story be modified by quantum effects from an expected future theory of quantum gravity? All
this uncertainty about how to model the unobservable universe opens up space for cosmological models
that feature different perspectives on time, which means that speculation about time in cosmology flour-
ishes as much as—if not even more than— ever, despite the subject now having more and better empirical
data than it has ever enjoyed before.
After a brief treatment of time in the standard model, we hope to give the reader a sense of some of
the live options available for time in cosmology which are of philosophical interest. Although time may
be infinite, space is not; as a result, our discussion necessarily will be abbreviated and selective.
1 Time in the Standard Model
The current standard model of cosmology, as mentioned, is usually called the ΛCDM. It extends the clas-
sic hot big bang model, which includes only normal matter and radiation, by including exotic cold dark
matter (CDM), the more exotic dark energy (Λ, the usual symbol for Einstein’s cosmological constant),
and a stage of inflation in the early universe that seeds the initial perturbations which give rise to struc-
ture in the universe. The theoretical core of the standard model is general relativity, which models the
universe as a four-dimensional spacetime manifold M endowed with a pseudo-Riemannian metric g and
matter-energy distribution T .
Observations suggest that the universe looks pretty much the same in every direction; supposing that
the same holds at every other location in the universe leads one to posit the cosmological principle: the
assumption that the universe is spatially homogeneous and isotropic. Applying this principle to general
relativity requires presuming that there is a congruence of timelike curves in the spacetime manifold
M which foliates it into a one-parameter (λ) family of spacelike hypersurfaces Σλ of constant intrinsic
curvature κ (which can be positively curved like a sphere, flat like a plane, or negatively curved like a
hyperbolic surface). The matter-energy distribution T in such a spacetime takes the form of a perfect
fluid with constant density ρ and pressure p on the hypersurfaces of constant curvature. The collection of
relativistic spacetimes that meet these conditions are known as the Friedman-Robertson-Walker (FRW)
spacetimes.
One usually thinks of the members of the family of hypersurfaces Σλ as representing space and λ
as representing time. Relativity, of course, permits the choice of another congruence of timelike curves
which also foliate M into “spaces”. So the sense in which λ represents time is relative to the choice of
congruence that gives rise to it as a parameter. Under the assumption of the cosmological principle and
choosing a foliation such that the corresponding spaces have constant curvature reduces Einstein’s field
equations to the following two:
H˙ +
4
3
pi(ρ + 3p) + H2 = 0; (1)
ρ˙ = −3H(ρ + p), (2)
where H, the Hubble parameter, represents the expansion rate of space, and overdots represent time
derivatives with respect to the chosen standard of time. Thus the first equation concerns the acceleration
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of the expansion of space (H˙); the second is a continuity equation for the “cosmic fluid”—made up of
radiation, dust, dark matter, dark energy, etc.
There is a natural standard of time to use in a non-vacuum FRW spacetime: the proper time of
anything not moving with respect to the cosmic fluid. Hypothetical objects that are at rest with respect
to it are called fundamental observers. Galaxies, for example, are approximately fundamental observers,
since they do not move much with respect to the background fluid. The proper time of the cosmic fluid,
which we will denote by t, is generally known as cosmic time.
Nevertheless, although the decomposition from above naturally picks out a particular time function
(t), the theory is still entirely relativistic. We chose to foliate spacetime into slices of constant spatial
curvature, but we could just as well have chosen an infinity of other foliations. It is therefore only when
we choose the natural foliation and use cosmic time that one can claim that the universe is 13.8 billion
years old—this duration is determined by the proper time of a hypothetical fundamental observer from
the beginning of time until now. By contrast, to photons the world just began. Relativity doesn’t choose
sides over who is right, fundamental observers, arbitrarily moving observers, or photons. All are.
2 Breaking Up Spacetime
One of the central lessons of contemporary physics is that space and time, traditionally thought to be
conceptually independent, are replaced by a unified spacetime. It may come as a surprise to many readers
to discover that some physicists and philosophers want to use cosmology to undo this revolution and
break up spacetime back into space and time. By “break up” we mean a genuine divorce, at the level of
basic theory, and not merely a temporary separation for pragmatic calculational convenience (which is
done all the time in numerical relativity). The thought behind the machinations is that cosmology actually
justifies resurrecting a Newton-like absolute time.
Indeed, one finds the idea arising just after relativity was born and espoused by some of cosmology’s
biggest stars. For instance, just three years after general relativity was discovered and only one year
after experimentally confirming it, Sir Arthur Eddington in 1920 wrote that “absolute space and time are
restored for phenomena on a cosmical scale,” hinting even that this cosmic time is God’s time (Eddington,
1920 [1987], 168). Sir James Jeans writes:
It was natural to try in the first instance to retain the symmetry between space and time which
had figured so prominently in [special relativity], but this was soon found to be impossible.
If the theory of relativity was to be enlarged so as to cover the facts of astronomy, then the
symmetry between space and time which had hitherto prevailed must be discarded. Thus
time regained a real objective existence, although only on the astronomical scale, and with
reference to astronomical phenomena. (Jean, 1935, 21)
That figures as significant as Eddington and Jeans suggest ditching the core postulates of relativity may
be somewhat shocking. Both seemed to want to restore an “intuitive” notion of time, although Eddington
gave off mixed signals on that matter (Canales, 2015).
Perhaps more isn’t made of this rejection because it’s not entirely clear whether either had a full
rejection of relativity in mind. Eddington says that relativity is “reduced to a local phenomenon.” Did he
really want to abandon the core conceptual insights of a theory that he helped confirm in local physics (i.e.,
the solar system) when applied to the universe? Similarly, Jeans’s talk of time regaining real objective
existence but only on the astronomical scale sounds somewhat obscure conceptually: what exactly is
“real” and “objective” about time on the astronomical scale and, more importantly, what does such a time
have to do with the intuitive time of our experiences?
Today those desirous of a sundering of spacetime are somewhat clearer. Their motivations are diverse.
Some file “philosophical” grounds for divorce, and others make their case for the sake of new physics.
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The first group, like Eddington and Jeans, wish to free “intuitive” metaphysical models of time from
the clutches of relativity (Lucas and Hodgson, 1990; Crisp, 2008; Swinburne, 2008). The idea that the
present is special, that it is what exists or what becomes, is famously threatened by relativity. Finding a
scientifically respectable absolute time according to which the world comes into being would give these
prospective bachelors the “proof” that they need. The second group is instead worried about quantum
mechanics and, more specifically, its famous measurement problem. Some solutions to this problem pick
out a preferred foliation of spacetime. Some hope that cosmology reveals this preferred foliation in its
choice of a natural time function (Roser and Valentini, 2014).
What is this special time function? Hawking proved that as long as a solution of Einstein’s field
equations is “causally stable” (loosely put, it doesn’t permit time travel or anything close to time travel)
the spacetime described possesses a global function whose value increases along every future directed
timelike or null worldline (Hawking, 1969). These time functions are a dime a dozen however: typically
there are an infinite number definable in any causally stable spacetime. Enter cosmology. The hope is
that cosmological considerations will narrow down these time functions to a smaller set, or better, to
something unique.
The key idea is to look at the (approximate) symmetries of the cosmological spacetimes. Observations
of the 2.7K cosmic microwave background radiation and galaxy counts support the claim that at a large
scale the universe is amazingly spatially isotropic. Deviations exist, but they are slight. The inference to
global homogeneity is more theoretical. If the universe were spatially inhomogeneous, then for it to look
so isotropic to us would mean we are very specially placed. Since it seems plausible that our location
is not special, we assume spatial homogeneity too, i.e. we assume the cosmological principle mentioned
above. In the context of general relativity, that gives us the constant (spatial) curvature spacetimes of
FRW, described above, and FRW’s special time function t, the cosmic time.
However, we should not insist on perfect isotropy and homogeneity, since our universe is certainly
not perfectly isotropic and homogeneous. So a time function somewhat less tailored to FRW is desirable.
One especially popular geometrical choice is York or constant mean curvature time (York, 1972). To
understand York time, consider the collection of relativistic spacetimes (M, g). Some of these spacetimes
can be foliated by everywhere spacelike three-dimensional hypersurfaces. The four dimensional geom-
etry obviously constrains the geometry on these spatial leaves; in fact, it induces on each hypersurface
Σ a spatial three-dimensional metric h (which determines the intrinsic curvature of Σ) and an “extrinsic
curvature” K (which, roughly speaking, describes how Σ is embedded in the entire spacetime M). Think-
ing of these in dynamical terms, e.g. in the initial value formulation of general relativity, you can regard
h as a configurational, position-like variable and K as its conjugate momentum (which therefore says
something about h’s time development). Now, on a select set of these spacetimes, we can find some that
permit a foliation where the mean extrinsic curvature associated with each spatial slice is constant. The
mean, or average, extrinsic curvature is given by the trace of K, Tr K. For these spacetimes each leaf of
the foliation is a hypersurface whose mean (extrinsic) curvature is equal to a constant, i.e., Tr K = n. York
time is then defined as a time function t : M → I ⊂ R such that its level sets t−1(I) are the hypersurfaces
with mean curvature equal to n, for every n ∈ I (Andersson et al., 2012). In short, each “tick” of the York
clock reads a value of constant mean curvature.1
Constant mean curvature is an interesting topic in differential geometry and has many physical ap-
plications. York time too has a number of virtues, especially when it comes to numerical relativity and
actual calculation. But in the present context what makes constant mean curvature and York time attrac-
tive is that under certain conditions it is provably unique (Marsden and Tipler, 1980; Rendall, 1996). For
instance, restrict attention to globally hyperbolic spacetimes spacetimes with a compact Cauchy hyper-
surface, a vanishing cosmological constant, and satisfying the so-called stromg energy condition. Then,
except for some outlier cases (Tr K = 0), the York time is provably unique. And as those three conditions
1The global spatial homogeneity of FRW spatial hypersurfaces implies that they have constant mean curvature, so York time
coincides with cosmic time in FRW spacetimes.
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Figure 1: A depiction of York time in a spacetime with singularities. Adapted from similar figures in
(Qadir and Wheeler, 1985).
are all geometrical in nature, one has a foliation that is in some sense geometrically unique (more below).
From a relativistic perspective, there is nothing surprising going on here. With York time one has just
picked a special foliation tied to the curvature properties of certain spacetimes, and in some sufficiently
special spacetimes this choice is natural. But one is no more forced to pick out a constant mean curvature
foliation than to pick a different foliation, such as Misner’s -log t, where t is the above FRW time (Misner,
1969). With York time in hand, however, those with the motivations described above now issue the
divorce papers to spacetime. For tensers, no less than existence itself unfolds according to York time. And
for those worried about quantum mechanics, the proposal is to identify the foliation quantum mechanics
uses with York time. Physics or metaphysics marches to the beat of York. As for relativity, it can be
abandoned. For the physics within the domain of special relativity, one sides with Lorentz over Einstein.
For larger scales, one uses only the solutions of Einstein’s equations that permit York time. The full
possibilities allowed by general relativity are viewed as unnecessary extravagance.
Many commentators have questioned this identification of York time with metaphysical or quan-
tum time. We cannot do justice to all the discussion here (see, for instance, (Bourne, 2004; Callender,
2017). Perhaps the largest question that needs answering is simply: Why? Why think that metaphys-
ical time or quantum time “cares” about constant mean curvature? Nothing in either metaphysics or
(non-gravitational) quantum mechanics suggests any connection to curvature, let alone constant mean
curvature. Why would metaphysical or quantum time care about maintaining an average? Here we will
confine ourselves to two comments.
First, the claims of the uniqueness of York time seem overblown–at least from the perspective of
taking it seriously as a physically as opposed to calculationally preferred time. The uniqueness results
occur only after quite a severe shrinking of the space of Einstein’s solutions. The assumptions about a
compact spatial slice, global hyperbolicity, the behavior of energy, and the cosmological constant may
not hold. Probably they don’t. But that is not all. Uniqueness is one thing, but existence is another.
When does the York time exist? There are in fact many spacetimes that meet the above conditions but
where York time does not exist. The “geometric invariance” of York time obtains only in a special class
of spacetimes, one hardly demanded by observation.
Second, we suspect that many of the philosophical devotees of York time pick it simply because it
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seems to them to yield an attractive intuitive picture of cosmological evolution—that it is more or less
like the familiar old absolute time of Newton or of their manifest weltbild. To chip away a little at this,
we’ll here note two relevant facts that we haven’t seen in the philosophical literature. One, what makes
York time great for numerical relativity but a bit weird for metaphysics is its avoidance of singularities.
York time is definable in universes which, like ours (at least classically), contains black holes harboring
singularities. The demand for constant mean curvature makes the foliation avoid these singularities,
exponentially slowing York time to avoid them and lumping them all together at the “end of time.” As a
result, a singularity in a black hole born “today” (according to “intuitive” time) and one born a million
years in your future (again, according to “intuitive” time) happen at the same moment of York time (Smarr
and York, 1978) (see Fig. 1). Two, during inflation the universe is said to enter into a de Sitter phase, that
is, be describable by de Sitter spacetime. In the usual coordinates of de Sitter, all the t =constant slices
do indeed have constant curvature, which is nice; however, they all have the same value. The York clock
seems to stop in the de Sitter phase! None of these small observations constitute a knock-down objection
to identifying York time with metaphysical or quantum time. But they should suggest to those hoping to
rescue “intuitive time” that it’s not really so much like our old friend absolute time.
3 Cosmological Speculations
As we just saw, the use of distinguished foliations in cosmology invites deep questions about the nature
of time and the significance of relativity. Putting those questions aside, the nature of time is pretty simple
according to the standard big bang model: the universe began a finite amount of time to the past and
will continue to expand indefinitely and ever faster to the future under the influence of dark energy; in
addition, the entropy of its matter-energy distribution increases irresolutely toward this future; and, well,
that’s about it.2
More specifically, due to the singularity theorems of Penrose, Hawking, and Geroch in the 1960s, the
standard big bang model seems firmly committed to a past initial singularity. This basic consequence
is intuitively suggested in typical expanding FRW universes since, assuming a positive cosmological
constant and gravitating matter, the scale factor goes to zero and the matter density blows up as one goes
back in time. The Hawking-Penrose singularity theorem makes the argument precise and therefore seems
to provide an answer to the age old question about whether time is finite or infinite, the subject of Kant’s
famous first antinomy: time is finite towards the past but infinite towards the future (for flat and open
cosmologies). Moreover, the geometrical modeling used in the big bang model allows one to skirt one of
Kant’s main worries, as the past is finite even though there is no “first” moment, just as there is no first
positive real number.
That straightforward picture, however, is under threat from speculation hoping to address various out-
standing theoretical problems. Modifications to the above picture—some quite dramatic—are frequently
suggested based on cosmological applications of research programs in quantum gravity (e.g. superstring
theory, loop quantum gravity) and from attempts to better understand inflation (e.g. eternal inflation). In-
deed, despite its successes, inflation brings with it its own problems, and new developments of the general
theory are regularly being proposed to escape these worries. These modifications essentially arise from
what would be new physics. But modifications to the straightforward picture are often also connected to
solutions of other perceived problems with the standard cosmological model. For instance, many physi-
cists find the initial singularity predicted by the singularity theorems of general relativity to be a sign of
the theory breaking down. They suspect that quantum effects will avoid these singularities. Similarly,
many find the posit that the universe began in extremely low entropy distasteful, or at least in need of
explanation (Carroll, 2010). Can a cosmological model be devised that makes the past low entropy a nat-
ural product of cosmological evolution as opposed to a special posit? Philosophers have debated whether
2See (Smeenk, 2013) for a thorough review of the standard picture of time in cosmology.
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these problems are really so dire (see (Earman, 1995) for discussion of singularities and (Callender, 2004)
and (Price, 2004) on the low entropy posit). Whether they are or not, eliminating one or both has led to the
development of interesting new cosmological models that part ways in various respects with the standard
picture of time. Here we briefly highlight some of the most prominent ideas that have gained currency.
3.1 Multiverses and the Past
One major development concerns multiverses. The idea that the universe given in the standard model is
just one of a multiverse of different universes has become a mainstream view in cosmology and theoretical
physics more generally. Interest in the multiverse derives from influential arguments that claim that the
multiverse is a natural consequence of inflationary (Steinhardt, 1983; Vilenkin, 1983; Linde, 1986) and
string theoretic scenarios (Susskind, 2007). On the scenario known as eternal inflation, for example, a
physical mechanism creates “bubble universes” – causally disconnected “pocket” universes – out of an
inflating background spacetime. Insofar as one takes inflation to be an important part of the contemporary
standard model of cosmology (the ΛCDM model), as cosmologists do, one has at least some reason to take
the multiverse seriously. And clearly the idea of a multiverse opens up some intriguing new possibilities
for the nature of time, possibilities that have only recently been explored.
The basic picture in eternal inflation is that the universe does not “enter into a de Sitter phase”, as
said above. Instead, the universe is essentially de Sitter space. The de Sitter universe is the relativistic
spacetime analog of a sphere, just as Minkowski space is the relativistic spacetime analog of a plane.
As such, it is the maximally symmetric spacetime with positive curvature (albeit it can be given a flat
spatial slicing like the k = 0 FRW spacetime). In cosmology the accelerated expansion of de Sitter
space is driven by a cosmological constant-like inflaton field in some appropriate potential. If spacetime
were merely de Sitter, then nothing much would happen of course, apart from continuous exponential
expansion. Quantum fluctuations of the inflaton field, however, can lead patches of spacetime to tunnel
to another state and cease inflating, in such a way that a bubble universe may be born in a hot, dense big
bang-like state. As bubble universes are continuously born, the space in between the universes continues
to expand (although there is generally some probability that bubble universes may collide).3 Thus one has
an eternally inflating (toward the future) background spacetime which spawns a multiverse of big-bang-
universe-like bubble universes, each of which has its own arrow of time, beginning, and (potentially, if it
recollapses) ending.
While many questions and concerns arise about the universe, let’s focus on the traditional one about
whether time is finite or infinite. The singularity theorems of Penrose, Hawking and Geroch do not hold
in an eternally inflating spacetime. These theorems make assumptions—typically about the behavior
of matter-energy—that are not true in eternal inflation. So we don’t have the same assurance that the
world begins with a bang in an inflationary scenario as we do in a classical non-inflationary spacetime.
Nonetheless, many cosmologists believe that the world still begins with a past singularity. They appeal
to influential arguments by Vilenkin, Borde, and Guth that show that the geodesics of the inflationary
multiverse scenario—eternal inflation—are past-incomplete, and hence that the inflationary multiverse
had a beginning (Farhi and Guth, 1987; Borde and Vilenkin, 1996; Borde et al., 2003). These arguments
have been called “singularity theorems” in analogy with the original classical singularity theorems. On
the basis of these theorems, it would seem that the fundamental picture of time in the multiverse remains
substantively the same as in the standard model, namely, finite to the past and infinite to the future
(although of course there is the novelty associated with the birthing of pocket universes, which introduces
times local to each universe).
But is that judgment correct? The eternal inflation“singularity theorems” are of quite a different char-
acter from those of Penrose, Hawking and Geroch. They do not, for instance, make any assumptions
about the behavior of energy, making them surprisingly general, nor do they apply to all past directed
3These collisions may even leave an detectable footprint in, for example, the CMB.
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geodesics, as past comoving geodesics are allowed to escape to past infinity. The main difference is
that the geodesic incompleteness of eternally inflating spacetimes is not due to spacetime singularities
but rather due to the spacetime being “incomplete”, i.e. extendible. This observation and the physical
plausibility of a steady-state-like eternal inflation have led Aguirre and Gratton, for example, to propose
an extension which would make eternal inflation “two-sided” and geodesically complete. In their model
eternal inflation proceeds in opposite temporal directions from a null boundary between the two regions,
each causally-disconnected half of the entire spacetime birthing bubble universes to their respective fu-
tures (Aguirre and Gratton, 2002, 2003). Nonetheless, there is a clear sense in which time is infinite in
both directions, since the arrows are connected at the boundary. Thus Aguirre and Gratton’s clever ma-
neuver would seem to restore Kant’s old antinomy, at least for eternally inflating spacetimes, since such
spacetimes may be either finite or infinite towards the past.
3.2 Bouncing Through the Big Bang
Dissatisfaction with inflationary theory, a distaste for singularities, or an aversion to multiverses has led
many to desire an alternative to the mainstream views. Some propose that a big bang singularity can be
avoided by a physical mechanism which causes a “bounce” before a singularity is reached. Thereby an
old, collapsing (epoch of the) universe leads to a new (epoch of the) universe, one which looks just like
the beginning of a classical big bang universe. Although the proposals flowing from the aforementioned
motivations differ, they often have similar ideas so it is common to lump them together as the class of
“bouncing” or “cyclical” cosmological models.4 On some models this “bounce” happens only once; on
other models it repeats and the universe oscillates much as a linked set of sausages, where the universes
expands and contracts repeatedly. In all cases, however, what we thought of as the past-finite universe is
only one epoch of a past-infinite universe of multiple epochs.
There are even more exotic possibilities though. Penrose proposes a model he calls the conformal
cyclic cosmology: he glues together the “end” of what we thought was our universe, namely the stretched
out accelerated infinite expansion, with the beginning of what we thought was our universe, the big bang.
He is able to make this identification due to a conjecture that both the beginning and the end are confor-
mally invariant. That is, despite appearing counterintuitive because of their size differences, the metrics
describing the beginning and the end are conjectured to be the same except for scale—distances are dif-
ferent but angles are the same. On this theory, what one takes to be inflation is actually the end of a
previous universe. This process repeats in a cycle and hence is an example of an infinitely recurring uni-
verse. Unlike in the “sausage link” model, where contracted big bangs are glued together, the conformal
rescaling allows Penrose to glue together large expanded regions with small contracted regions.
It should be noted that bouncing and cyclical models do have a long history in cosmological thought,
and indeed they have periodically appeared as scientific proposals in the 20th century.5 Thus the recent
spate of them is not entirely novel. What is novel is the ever increasing breadth of these proposals and
the ingenious application of theoretical resources. What makes these models more than just an exercise
in pure reasoning is that they can be used to make predictions about (what in the standard model would
be called) the early universe, in particular the primordial spectrum of inhomogeneities that gave rise to
the formation of stars and galaxies. Whether any of the predictions of these higher speculations will be
confirmed (or are even confirmable) of course remains to be seen. But for philosophers of time, at least, it
is worth noting that for now many of these remarkable proposals provide viable alternatives to the default
view that time is finite to the past.
4Prominent examples include those discussed in (Khoury et al., 2001; Steinhardt and Turok, 2007; Ashtekar, 2009; Penrose,
2010). A recent review of bouncing models is (Battefeld and Peter, 2014).
5A fine survey of this history can be found in (Kragh, 2011, Ch. 8).
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Figure 2: Aeons of time in a conformal cyclic universe.
3.3 Eliminating the Past Hypothesis
To explain the thermodynamic arrow of time most physicists and philosophers feel that one must, in
some sense or other, assume that the early universe began in a state of extremely low entropy. Making
this assumption, typical initial states will then be overwhelmingly likely to evolve toward higher entropy
states. Distinguished physicists such as Boltzmann and Feynman saw the need for such an initial posit
and subsequent philosophers have generally agreed with it. FollowingAlbert (2000), this assumption is
often dubbed the ”past hypothesis.”
As noted already, several physicists and philosophers feel that explaining the low entropy state of the
very early universe is one of the great mysteries still remaining in physics. The goal is to find a dynamical
origin of the past hypothesis. If one can show that dynamical laws necessitate a low entropy state in our
local past, then we can get rid of the otherwise ad hoc past hypothesis. To this end, several physicists have
in recent years proposed cosmological models that do not require the invocation of the past hypothesis
Aguirre and Gratton (2003); Carroll and Chen (2004); Barbour et al. (2014); Goldstein et al. (2016).
Some of these approaches are closely connected to the topics of the previous subsections: the Carroll and
Chen (2004) model, like the Aguirre and Gratton (2003) model,6 is an eternally inflating multiverse with
dual arrows of time, whereas the Barbour et al. (2014) model is a version of a “one bounce” cosmology
driven by gravity.
Cosmological considerations of course have always been at the heart of discussions of time’s arrow.
Boltzmann’s cosmological story was in fact not entirely unlike the bouncing universe scenarios. Thermal
fluctuations to states of low entropy are in effect past boundaries for two “universes”, each with an op-
positely directed arrow of time, pointed in the direction of increasing entropy. Later, approximately 30
years after the Hubble expansion of the universe was discovered, the cosmologist Thomas Gold suggested
that expansion caused the thermodynamic arrow of time (Gold, 1962). Boltzmann’s theory was roundly
dismissed when he proposed it, as he wrote well before the advent of modern cosmology. And Gold’s
idea was criticized by many, as the link between expansion and thermodynamic entropy wasn’t as tight
as Gold hoped.
6See (Vilenkin, 2013) for discussion of these models in relation to the arrow of time.
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Figure 3: The arrow of time aligning with increasing entropy in “two-sided” universes.
In the model of Goldstein et al. (2016), we see something like Boltzmann’s original idea being floated
again, possibly also connected to something like Gold’s original idea. They examine a toy model, a large
classical gas of non-interacting particles in Euclidean space. Measuring the size of 3d space occupied by
the gas, they find that normal evolution takes the gas to a central time where the gas occupies a uniquely
minimum size. They further show that the entropy associated with this measure of system size grows in
both temporal directions away from this central time. Each solution comes with its own past hypothesis,
if you like, at its central time. No special additional posit is necessary. Interestingly, this is compatible
with a Boltzmannian picture of statistical mechanics, one where most microstates realizing low entropy
macrostates evolve into states realizing higher entropy macrostates. This picture is a lot like Boltzmann’s
original idea, except that the matter and size of the space it occupies grows without bound and hence
“bounces” once, unlike in Boltzmann’s model. Insofar as the model is connected to expansion, there is
also an echo of Gold’s idea here too. Gold’s idea faltered because there was no necessary link between
expansion and entropy increase. Expansion can be an isentropic process, so it is hard to see how it could
cause the thermodynamic arrow. Whether the present idea suffers a similar fate, however, remains to be
investigated.
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